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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CLAIR R. LISTER, BEN BOYCE,
EVAN J. LISTER and CARLISLE
JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

12133

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPOND1E:NT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action on a contractor's bond issued by defendant. Plaintiffs seek claims under this bond for work
performed for James A. Wardle Construction Company and
for equipment rental.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs' and defendant's motions for summary judgment were heard at the same time upon stipulation. The
trial court found in favor of defendant and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice and upon the merits.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks to have the trial court's summary
judgment affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 16, 1962, Insurance Adjustment Go., Inc.,
wrote the following letter to Mr. J. Harlan Burns who was
and is the attorney for the plaintiffs:
"Mr. J. Harlan Burns
Attorney at Law
25 East Lincoln Avenue
Cedar City, Utah
Dear Mr. Burns:
Bond No. 8064059' - Claim 400-B-11663 J. H.
Wardle Company, Principal R. J. Daum Con- ·
struction Co., Obligee Contract AT 29-2-116 NTS
Projct 410-1 (Mercury, Nevada)
Claimants: Clair Lister, Evan Lister, Ben Boyce
Reference is made to our letter addressed to you
March 14, 1962, wherein we listed outstanding wage
claims as follows:
$277.38
Ben Boyce
281.98
Clair Lister
196.98
Evan Lister
The Evan Lister account has been reduced $25 inasmuch as Mr. Wardle personally paid Mr. Lister $25 in
cash one day when they were both in the writer's office. The present balance due Evan Lister is, therefore, $171.98.
Payment of these accounts has been approved by J. H.
Wardle and the Great American Insurance Company,
and we are prepared to forward to you checks for the
amounts listed above. Kindly advise if these amounts
are acceptable.
Very truly yours,
INSURANCE ADJUSTMENT COMP ANY, INC.
JDH/h

J. D. Hagman, Jr.
Manager"

Particular attention is directed to the fact that the letter
notified Mr. Burns that payment of the sums mentioned in
the Jetter had been approved by Great American Insurance
Company and requested Burns to advise if these amounts
were acceptable.
From plaintiffs' brief in this court at page 4, we quote
as follows:
"Plaintiffs again contested the amounts of said claims
and brought suit against Insurance Adjustment, Inc.,
on December 12, 1962. Great American Insurance
Company did not choose to join in this suit and defend
on the merits, but proceeded to have this suit dismissed
on the grounds that Insurance Adjustment Co. was an
independent contractor and proper service was not
made. (Ex. "M", plaintiffs' memorandum)
The suit against Insurance Adjustment, Inc., was
dismissed on Motion for Summary Judgment; the order being granted on August 1, 1961, whereupon plaintiffs filed suit against the Great American Insurance
Company." (The date of August 1, 1961 should be
August 1, 1966)
Plaintiffs filed suit against Great American Insurance
Company on August 8, 1966. Defendant pleaded the following statutes of limitations as a defense:
Paragraph 7 of the bond written by defendant, which
provided:
"No action, suit or proceeding shall be had or maintained against the Surety under this bond unless it
shall be brought or instituted and process served upon
the Surety within six (6) months after the Principal
shall have ceased performing the work specified in the
contract and in no event after six ( 6) months subsequent to the date, time or period fixed in the contract
for the completion of the work specified therein."
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Paragraph 31-19-19, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
which provided:
"31-19-19. Void conditions, stipulations or agreements.
(1) No insurance contract delivered or issued for delivery in this state and covering subjects located, resident or to be performed in this state shall contain any
condition, stipulation, or agreement.

(a) requiring it to be construed according to the
laws of any other state or country except as
necessary to meet the requirements of the motor vehicle financial responsibility laws of
such other state or country; or
(b) depriving the courts of this state of the jurisdiction of action against the insurer; or
(c) limiting right of action against the insurer to
a period of less than one year from the time
when the cause of action accrues in connection
with all insurances other than property and
marine and transportation insurance. In contracts of property insurance, or of marine and
transportation insurance such limitation shall
not be to a period of less than one year from
the date of the loss.
(2) Any such condition, stipulation or agreement shall
be void, but such voiding shall not affect the validity
of the other provisions of the contract." (Emphasis
added)
Paragraph 31-19-35, Utah Code Annotated (1953)
which provided:
"31-19-35 Insurance Policy - Conditions or provisions
not in compliance with Insurance Code - Validity and
construction of. - Any insurance policy, rider or en·
dorsement hereafter issued and otherwise valid which '
contains any condition or provision not in compliance

with the requirments of this code, skaU not be rendered
invalid thereby, but shall be construed and applied in
accordance with suck conditions and provisions as
would have applied had suck policy, rider or endorsement been in fuM compliance with this code." (Emphasis added)
The defendant Great American Insurance Company
filed a motion for a summary judgment and filed an affidavit by J. D. Hagman (R. 7-8) which attached a copy of
the bond and alleged that the work on the project was completed in March, 1962. Suit was filed against Great American Insurance Company on August 8, 1966 four years and
five months after the work had been completed. Plaintiff
did not deny this fact, but made a motion for summary
judgment in favor of plaintiff. The court granted defendant's motion and plaintiff has appealed.
The record filed in this court on July 14, 1970, includes
the complaint and answer in the case of Lister, et al. v. Insurance Adjustment Co., Inc. (No. 140398) and reference
is made in appellant's brief to the action against Insurance
Adjustment Co., Inc. The complaint against Insurance Adjustment Co., Inc. refers to a suit by Lister, et al. against
James H. Wardle. Because the reference to the two other
cases may be confusing without a more complete narrative
of the events which bring this litigation to its present posture, we quote the following from the defendant's memorandum in support of summary judgment filed in the case of
Lister, et al., v. Great American Ins. Co., of New York and
filed on appeal to this court on November 19, 19170, as a
supplement to the record on appeal.
"This suit involves a claim for unpaid wages.
Plaintiffs were all employees of James H. Wardle Construction Company. On or about March 6, 1961,
Wardle entered into a contract with R. J. Daum Construction Company for a certain construction work at
Mercury, Nevada. (See Exhibit "A" attached hereto
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and incorporated in Hagman's affidavit.) In connection with the subcontract agreement, Great American Insurance Company issued its bond No. 8064059
to J. H. Wardle Company as principal with R. J. Daum
Construction Company as obligee. (See Exhibit "B"
attached hereto and incorporated in Hagman's affidavit.)
The bond contains the following pertinent provision:
"7. No action, suit or proceeding shall be had or
maintained against the Surety under this bond unless
it shall be brought or instituted and process served upon the Surety within six ( 6) months after the Principal shall have ceased performing the work specified in
the contract and in no event after six ( 6) months subsequent to the date, time or period fixed in the contract for the completion of the work specified therein."
Wardle completed his construction work sometime
in January, 1962. All work was completed and accepted on March 19, 1962. (See Exhibit "C" attached
hereto and incorporated in Hagman's affidavit.)
Sometime in February, 1962, plaintiffs went to the
office of Mr. J. D. Hagman of the Insurance Adjustment Company, Inc. for the purpose of securing unpaid
wages from the bonding company. On March 14, 1962,
Mr. Hagman sent a letter to Mr. Harlan Burns, the
plaintiffs' attorney, advising him that the unpaid
wages had been discussed with Mr. Wardle and that
certain amounts were agreed to be due and owing. A
copy of said letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D".
Apparently, the amounts suggested in Hagman's letter
of March 14, 1962, were not acceptable to the plain·
tiffs, for they filed suit against J. H. Wardle Company
in Utah County. The Great American Insurance Com·
pany was not made a party to that action and was
never served with notice of the suit. A default judg·
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ment against J. H. Wardle Company in the amount of
$4,726.37 plus costs in the amount of $13.20 was entered on June 12, 1962.
On October 16, 1962, Mr. Hagman sent another letter to Attorney Burns advising him that payment of
the amounts listed in the letter to the plaintiffs had
been approved by Wardle and by the Great American
Insurance Company and that checks would be sent if
the amounts were agreeable. (See Exhibit "E" attached hereto.)
These amounts were apparently not acceptable to
the plaintiffs as an action was then filed against the
Insurance Adjustment Company on or about December
12, 1962. The Insurance Adjustment Company filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment in that case, which
was heard before Judge Aldon Anderson on July 29,
1966. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was granted on August 1, 1966. A copy of the order
is attached hereto as Exhibit "F".
Thereafter, the plaintiffs' attorney filed suit
against the Great American Insurance Company on
August 8, 1966. Defendant answered the complaint by
its Motion for Summary Judgment, which is dated
August 31, 1966."
Plaintiff's and defendant's motions for summary judgment were argued before Judge D. Frank Wilkins on November 25, 1968. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on May 6, 1970.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON THE GROUND THAT PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION.
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Defendant Great American Insurance Company of
New York contends that its Motion for Summary Judg.
ment was properly granted because suit was not commenced
against the company within six (6) months after the work
was completed.
In the recent Utah case of Anderson v. Beneficial Fire
and Casualty Company, 21 U.2d 173, 442 P.2d 933 (1968),
an action was brought against an insurance company seeking an amount allegedly due for a fire loss. There the policy
contained a provision that "no suit ... shall be sustainable
... unless all the requirements of this policy shall have been
complied with and unless commenced within twelve (12)
months after inception of the loss." The defendant Beneficial rejected the plaintiff's claim three weeks prior to the
twelve-month deadline. Suit was filed three months after
the limitations provision in the policy. The defendant insurance company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which
was granted by Judge Stewart M. Hanson of the Third Ju·
dicial District Court. On appeal, this court affirmed holding
that dismissal of the suit was proper on the ground the insured had not filed suit within the one-year period after the
loss required by the terms of the policy.
In Meyer v. Building and Realty Service Co., Inc., 196
NE 250, 100 ALR 1442, the court held a contractor's bond is
a contract of suretyship and not an insurance contract within the meaning of the Indiana statute prohibiting insurance
companies from limiting by agreement the period within
which suit may be brought to less than three years:
" ... An examination of the cases cited by appellant, to
the proposition that the surety company is an insurer.
and many other cases might be added to the list, it will
be observed that they are cases involving the rights of
the insured against the indemnity company and relate
to a construction of some ambiguous language in the
contract.
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In construing an ambiguous prov1s10n in a corporate surety contract, the courts apply the rule applicable to insurance policies, namely, that the language will be construed most strongly against the insurance company. In such cases it can make very little
difference to call corporate surety an 'insurer', and
his contract a policy of insurance. This seems to be the
only innovation thus far made by the courts in construing corporate surety contracts. But when the courts
are dealing with the rights, remedies, and defenses of
a surety, the rules of insurance furnish no help. A contract of surety creates a tripartite relation between the
party secured, the principal obligor, and the party secondarily liable, and the rights, remedies, and defenses
of a surety cannot be disassociated from this relationship even though you call the contract one of insurance. This tripartite relationship is always present in
a surety contract, while an insurance contract in itself
never creates a tripartite relation analogous to the
suretyship relation. While insurance contracts are in
many respects similar to surety contracts, yet there is
a very wide difference between the two kinds of contracts. Insurance has been defined as a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against loss,
damage, or liability arising from an unknown or contingent event; whereas a contract of suretyship is one
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, and a contract of suretyship is not altered because made by a corporation for compensation. Notwithstanding the fact, surety contracts, when executed
by a corporation for compensation has sometimes been
spoken of by the courts as insurance contracts, the fact
still remains that the wide difference, above mentioned,
still exist. We are clearly of the opinion that the contract here in question is a contract of suretyship and
not an insurance policy. Union Indemnity Co. v. Vetter
(C.C.A. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 606; Maryland Casualty Co.
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v. Hjorth (1925) 187 Wiss. 270, 202 N.W. 665; Maine
Lumber Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1926) 216 App,
Div. 35, 214 N.Y.S. 621; Mahana v. Alexander (1927)
88 Cal. App. 111, 263 P. 260.
The statute above set out only purports to apply
to insurance corporations, and we would not be justified in extending its provisions to include companies
engaged in an altogether different kind of business.
For the reasons above stated we hold that the clause
in the bond, not to sue after twelve months from the
time of the discovery of the act or ommission of the
principal on account of which claim is made, is valid
and binding, and there was no error in sustaining a11pellee's demurrer to the complaint.
Judgment affirmed."
Section 31-19-19, supra, provides that an insurance
contract shall not contain a limitation period of less than
one year. Assuming, but not admitting, this provision
governs the "construction bond" in question, Section 31-1935 extends the limitation p e r i o d in the bond to one year
when the two sections are construed together as they must
be. Section 35 provides the bond shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provisions as
would have applied had such policy rider or endorsement
been in full compliance with this code. ·The effect of this
section is to write into the bond a one-year limitation statute
as allowed by Section 19. Plaintiff's claim is clearly barred
by the one year statute of limitation if the bond is construed
under the provisions of the Insurance Code.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ESTOPPED FROM RELYING
UPON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
In Hagman's letter of October 16, 1962, Attorney
Burns was notified that the "Great American Insurance
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Company'' was prepared to pay certain amounts to the
plaintiffs. The negotiations entered into by Hagman of the
Insurance Adjustment Company on behalf of the Great
American Insurance Company, do not amount to waiver
of any provision of the policy or of any defense of the insurer. See Section 31-19-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which contains the following provision:
"None of the following acts by or on behalf of an
insurer shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any
provision of a policy or of any defense of the insurer
thereunder:
(1) Acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of

loss or of claim under the policy.

(2) Furnishing forms for reporting a loss or
claim, for giving information relative thereto, or for
making proof of loss, or receiving or acknowledging
receipt of any such form of proofs filled out.
(3) Investigating any loss or claim under any policy or engaging in negotiations looking toward a
possible settlement of any such loss ·Or claim." (Emphasis added.)

The plaintiffs rejected the offer of the Great American
Insurance Company and elected to sue the Insurance Adjustment Company in an attempt to recover on the default
judgment against J. H. Wardle Company. The action
against the Insurance Adjustment Company was dismissed
by summary judgment. The plaintiffs' action against the
bonding company was filed over four years after the work
was completed on the construction job. Their claim is clearly barred by the provisions of the bond and by the statutes
quoted above. A similar provision was enforced by the Supreme Court in the Anderson case, supra, and should be enforced in this action.
In plaintiff's complaint against Insurance Adjustment
Co., Inc. (Record filed July 14, 1970, p. 25), the plaintiff
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alleged that suit was filed against Wardle (the employer of
plaintiff on March 21, 1962) and alleged the bond number
8064059. The record shows the work was completed in
March, 1962, so the plaintiff was not in any way led to believe he would not have to sue in order to collect the amount
he claimed was unpaid. It is difficult to understand how he
could get the number of the bond written by Great American Insurance Company and not learn the name of the bonding company.
The defendant Insurance Adjustment Company filed
its answer in the case against it on January 8, 1963, which
was a general denial. This pleading was notice to plaintiff
that he had sued the wrong defendant.
The defendant Insurance Adjustment Company filed
its motion for summary judgment which came on for hear·
ing on July 29, 1966, and defendant's motion was granted.
The order granting the motion is found at page 42 of the
record filed November 19, 1970. The order recites that
"plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 (the bond issued by the Great
American Insurance Company to J. H. Wardle, as principal
and R. J. Daum Construction Company as obligee) ... hav·
ing been introduced in evidence ... " The record does not
support plaintiff's contention (page 6 of its brief) that In·
surance Adjustment Company and Great American Insur·
ance Company "led" the plaintiff into committing "techni·
cal errors." The record supports a finding that plaintiffs
had the bond of Great American Insurance Company in
their possession on December 12, 1962 when they copied its
number 8064059 in paragraph 8 of their complaint against
Insurance Adjustment Company as shown by page 26 of the
record filed July 14, 1970. This bond is found at page 11
and 12 of the record. Its number 8064059 is typed on its
face over the bold type "Great American Insurance Com·
pany" and the same name in bold type is found over the sig·
nature of the attorney-in-fact. The complaint against In·
surance Adjustment Company was filed on December 12,
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1962 which still left three months on the one year period of
limitations if it is construed under the Utah Insurance statutes.
CONCLUSION
Defendant contends that the six-month statute of limitations contained in the bond is applicable and is a bar to
plaintiff's action. If the bond is construed under the provisions of the Insurance Code, the one-year statute of limitations applies and also bars plaintiff's action which was not
filed until four years and five months after the work had
been completed.
Defendant has not waived the six-month limitation nor
the one-year limitation of the Insurance Code and should
not be estopped to assert them. Plaintiffs were not mislead
as they did file an action against James H. Wardle Construction Co. in March of 1962. Plaintiffs then filed another suit against The Insurance Adjustment Co. in December of 1962 when they apparently had the defendant's bond
in their possession which s h o w s on its face that Great

American Insurance Company is the surety.

Plaintiffs obviously pursued their legal remedies in
court. They had the duty to sue the proper party within the
prescribed time.
The Summary Judgment entered by the trial court in
favor of the defendant should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER, ESQ.
M. JOHN ASHTON, ESQ.
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

